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Private investors have an important role to play  transition period.  Such a strategy would also
in the ongoing process of reform in Eastern  force governments to finance their deficits
Europe.  So external creditworthiness is crucial  internally, thereby increasing accountability.
to a successful transition. Large government
borrowing crowds out the formation of private  Debt for equity swaps represent an attractive
contracts between international investors and  vehicle for debt reduction in the highly indebted
domestic entrepreneurs and firms.  Given the  countries of Eastern Europe.  Such schemes,
overall credit ceiling in international lending, the  when tied to the privatization effort, are not
public sector needs to curtail its external borrow-  inflationary - unlike the case of the public debt
ing to leave room for the private sector.  for private equity schemes of Latin America.
They simply represent a swap of public liabili-
This also implies that public debt reduction  ties, and they create value to the extent that
may be especially desirable in the highly in-  foreign private investment leads to positive
debted countries of Eastem Europe.  Rather than  externalities. The challenge will be to create
IT flood the public sector with new loans, interna-  swap mechanisms that will allow the Easten.
tional organizations should attempt to improve  Europe countries to retain a large share of those
domestic creditworthiness by supporting debt  gains.
reduction and borrowing restraints during the
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The recent  political  changes  in  Eastern .trope  (EE)  aim at the
creation  of political  and  economic  institutions  in the  style  of the  West.  With
amazing  rapidity  East  Germany  has  been re-unified  with  West Germany,  and  the
post-communist  politicians  of Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Hungary  have dropped
any support  for  a "third  way" and  seem intent  on  moving  to a fully  fledged
market  economy.  The  Soviet  Union  has initially  moved  in the  same  direction  but
now seems  to  be backing  off on the  way to reform.  At the  same  time,  the  old
system  based  on central  planning  is crumbling  for lack  of  proper  incentive
schemes  to allocate  scarce  resources  to their  most efficient  use. It is  hoped
that  a ,eliance  on  market  signals,  together  with financial  discipline  and the
integration  of the  productive  structures  into  the  international  system  will
allow  for  a renewal  of economic  development  and  growth.  But important
uncertainties  persist;  in  particular,  the  scope,  timing  and form  of
privatizations  programs  are still  the  subject  of  heated  debates;  and the
potential  role of the  Western  public  and  private  sectors  remains  poorly
defined.
During  the transition  period,  EE governments  will  have to ensure  that
macroeconomic  conditions  as  well  as microeconomic  incentive  systems  allow  and
encourage  adjustment.  Large  sectors  of economic  activity  neel to close  down,
and  new sectors  with comparative  advantages  allowed  to emerge.  Labor  must  be
retrained  and  must reallocate  to new  jobs.  Savings  must  be collected  and
institutions  created  to  direct  scarce  investment  resources  efficiently.  The
public  sector  must shrink  and  redirect  its  attention  only  to activities  where
markets  cannot  be expected  to function  properly.  Important  factors  that
contribute  to this  transformation  are:  social  stability,  price  stability,
credibility  of the  reform  process  and  of the  new  hard  budget  constraints,  open
trade  and international  technological  transfers,  especially  in the  managerial
sphere.
It is uncertain  whether  EE countries  catch  up rapidly  or slowly  with-3-
the rest  of Europe.  But  various  ingredients  that  have  been revealed  to  be
important  for  growth  in other  countries  are present  in EE--high  levels  of
schooling,  low income  inequality,  and the  proximity  of large  and  unexplc'ited
markets  in the  EC.  But entrepreneurship  is  hampered  by  ill  defined  property
rights  and a lack  of a  market  tradition.  During  the  transition  period,
pressures  on resources  will increase  dramatically,  as the  supply  side takes
time  before  it responds  to  new relative  prices.  The  burden  of the  past  will
extract  its  toll.  And the  dismantling  of the  CMEA trading  system  will  hit
these  countries  hard.
New international  borrowing--from  private  and  official  sources--can
reduce  resource  scarcity  for  the  countries  that  are  creditworthy.  But  for the
non-creditworthy  countries,  private  loans  will  not  be forthcoming  unless  some
debt is forgiven  and  the  reform  process  is  deepened.  As a result,  the
formation  of private  contracts  between  domestic  and foreign  investors  will
remain  inhibited  (the  debt  overhang  effect).  We also argue  that large  official
loans  from  the  West--while  helpful  in the  short  run--run  counter  to the  reform
process.  They tend to favor  sectors  that  fall  outside  the  market  sphere;  when
directed  to the  domestic  private  sector,  they  tend  to be allocated  in an
inefficient  way; they  can reduce  the  incentives  to reforms;  and they increase
the  debt  overhang,  reducing  further  the  ability  of the  emerging  private  sector
to directly  contract  with foreign  counterparts.
So  how should  the  West use  it.-  economic  resources  to promote  a
successful  transition  to  a market  economy  in EE?  While the  precise  answer  will
certainly  vary from  country  to country,  the  overall  goals  should  be the
promotion  of a private  sector  under  price  stability.  Ideally,  the  public
external  debts  should  be low  enough  to  allow  the  emerging  private  sector  to  be
able to enter  into  credible  contracts  with international  investors  and  banks.
This implies  that the  official  sector  in the  West must  maintain  delicate
balances  between  new loans  to the  public  sectors  and  debt reduction.  For the.4-
highly i--lebted  countries  that  have lost  access  to  voluntary  finance,  we argue
that  official  debt reduction  is  more  productive  that  new  loans.  As a result,  a
large  share  of foreign  assistance  should  be directed  at reducing--rather  than
increasing--public  sectors  indebtedness,  especially  in Poland,  Hungary  and
Yugoslavia.  However,  debt reduction  should  not  be upfronted,  but instead,  it
should  remain  conditional  on advances  in  the  reform  programs.  Besides  debt
reduction,  we also  discuss  mechanisms  that  can  be used to increase  the
efficiency  of existing  international  financial  contracts,  and in  particular,
debt to equity  swap  mechanisms.
The paper  is  structured  in four  sectiorts.  In section  I,  we review  the
recent  economic  history  of EE. In section  II,  we argue  that  growth  will not
pick  up  unless  property  rights  are  clarified.  In section  III,  we discuss
issues  related  to the  privatization  drive  and  we examine  the  potential  role  of
foreign  investors.  In  section  IV,  we develop  the  case  for  external  debt
reduction  and transformation  for  Poland,  Hungary,  and  Yugoslav'¢  And  analyze
possible  mechanisms  to achieve  these  goals.
I.  Political  Liberalization  and  Economic  Performance:  Lessons  From History.
The current  crisis  of EE economies  is  best understood  in a  historical
perspective.  We see  the  developments  in these  countries  as a sequence  of
stages  which  follow  logically  one  from  another.  These  stages,  which  are
described  and analyzed  in  detail  below,  are:
Stage  1. Forced  industrialization  under  central  plarnning.
Stage  2. Financing  of centrally  planned  investments  by monetization
and  foreign  borrowing.
Stage  3.  Open inflation.
Stage  4. Stabilization  attempts  with  no supply  response.
Each country  went or is going  through  these  four  stages  at its  own  pace.
Poland  and  Yugoslavia  came  out  of stage  3 into  stage  4 in 1990.1  Bulgaria  is
'The  case of Poland  is reviewed  in Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990).-5-
moving  from  stage  2 into  stage  3,  but  may  be soon  in stage  4. Czechoslovakia
may never  have entered  stage  2 and  may skip  stages  3 and  4 by privatizing  its
industry  in a short  period  of time.  Hungary  is  difficult  to classify,  It
cannot  borrow  abroad,  and its  inflation  rate is increasing.
Underlying  the  events  there  was a long term  trend  towards  political
liberalization.  This trend  can  be taken  as exogenous  for  the  urposes  of this
paper.  In retrospect,  it  appears  that  political  liberalization  had an adverse
impact  on economic  performance.  The  essence  of the  problem  is that  while in
capitalism  success  is rewarded  end in stalinism  failure  is punished,  in
democratic  socialism  individuals  have the  same  pay-offs  regardless  of their
efforts  or the  outcomes  of these  efforts.  Egalitarianism  and  restrictions  on
ownership  prevent  individuals  from  being  rewarded  for  their  efforts.  in a
liberal  political  environment  where  minimum  standards  of living  are  guaranteed
by the state  failure  is  also  not  punished.  Thus,  democratic  social.sm  is in
theory  a "no  carrot,  no stick"  economic  system.  The interplay  between  the
inefficiencies  of socialism  and  the  pre-'ailing  egalitarian  ideology  had
important  consequences  in the  macroeconomic  sphera.  The  need to equalize
incomes  and to  minimize  unemployment  forced  governments  to subsidize
inefficient  and loss-making  enterprises.  Due to these  subsidies  these
countries  ran large  consolidated  public  sector  deficits  which  eventually  led
to macroeconomic  instability.
Stage  1: Forced  industrialization under central  planning.
After the  Second  World  War, the  policy  of centrally  planned  massive
industrialization  was exported  from  the  Soviet  Union  to all  EE countries.  High
investment/GDP  ratios  were typical.  The repressive  political  environment
allowed  for  compression  of real  wages,  so that  domestic  savings  were  high
enough  to finance  these  high investment  levels.  This  was a period  of
macroeconomic  stability  and  rapid  growth,  but standards  of living  were low.-6-
Stage  2: Financing  with  monetization  and  foreign  borrowing.
After  Stalin's  death  there  was a gradual  increase  in political
freedom,  pi-orpted  in part  by fe.  :s  of explosions  like  that  of  Hungary  in 1956.
Although  the  Czechoslovak's  experiment  with "socialism  with a  human face"  was
crushed,  and  Khrushchev  was eventually  ousted,  the  general  tendency  towards
increased  political  liberalization  was  unmistakable  by the late  1960's.
Political  liberalization  had two  main  effects  on the  economic  sphere.
First,  it  became  increasingly  difficult  to contain  the  aspirations  of the
population  for  better  living  conditions.  Second,  as discipline  started
deteriorating,  and corruption  blossomed,  economic  efficiency  decreased.  The
multiple  attempts  at increasing  efficiency  by decentralization  were
ineffective,  and  probably  counter-productive.
The adverse  effects  of the  political  liberalization  made it  virtually
impossible  to finance  investment  from  voluntarv  domestic  savings.  However,
although  investment  rates  decreased,  they  remained  very  high  when compared  to
those  of Western  economies.  The  nomenklatura  continued  to  control  the  economy,
and  its  preference  for  empire  building  and  large  projects  is  well documented.
The increased  consumption  had  therefore  to  be financed  from  abroad  or through
money  creation.  During  this  stage  the  EE socialist  economies  ran large  current
account  deficits.  In this  way they  could,  to some  extent,  avoid  monetizing
their  public  sector  deficits.  With the  exceptions  of Yugoslavia,  which  moved
to self-management  in  the 50's,  and of  Hungary  which  initiated  reforms  in
1968,  the  allocation  of resources  continued  to  be centrally  determined.  Price
controls  remained  in  place,  so money  creation  was  not  reflected  in high
inflation  rates.  Rather,  these  countries  developed  the  syndrome  known  as
"money  overhang:"  an abnormally  high  money/GDP  ratio.
Stage  3: Open inflation.
Sooner  or later  foreign  creditors  would  have to limit  the  flow  of-7-
resources  to the inefficient  and  bankrupt  EE socialist  countries.  As this
happened,  monetary  creation  accelerated,  and  it  was impossible  to maintain
price  controls.  Inflation  rates  skyrocketed  in Poland  and  Yugoslavia,  and
increased  to  double  digit  levels  in  Hungary.  Bulgaria  is  now entering  this
stage.  While  political  events  had  an important  impact  on the  economic  sr
in take earlier  stages,  the inflationary  explosion  of Stage  3  had a feedback
effect  on the  political  sphere:  the  government's  authority  was eroded  by the
evident  failure  of the  economic  system.  The  central  planning  mechanism  was
gradually  dismounted,  and  replaced  mostly  by self-management.
2 As a
consequence,  the  economic  performance  further  deteriorated.
Political  and  economic  liberalization  had othei  adverse  impacts.  In
some countries  the scope  for  private  entrepreneurship  was expanded,  and
exterior  signs  of wealth  went unrepressed.  Citizens  were also  al.howed  to open
bank accounts  denominated  in foreign  exchange.  As has  been pointed  out  by
Manuel  Hinds (1990),  these  developments  further  perverted  the  incentive
structures  of EE  economies.  In the  old times  there  was little  incentive  to
divert  resources  from  the  State,  since  a high level  of consumption  was  not
allowed  and the  implicit  interest  rates  on the  available  financial  instruments
were  negative.  Under  a more liberal  environment  an individual  can  consume,
save in  US dollars  or German  marks,  or even  invest  in his/her  own  business.
The incentives  to appropriate  public  resources  were  therefore  multiplied.  The
punishments  for these  crimes  were simultaneously  virtually  abolished.  The
outcome  was a noticeable  increase  in illegal  and semi-legal  activity.
Stage  4: Stabilization  attempts  vith  no supply  response.
On January  1st  1990,  both Poland  and  Yugoslavia  embarked  into  tough
stabilization  programs.  These  plans  were  very similar:  the  basic  elements
were:  a) fixed  exchange  rates  and  wage controls,  which  would function  as
2For  a study  of Yugoslav  self  management,  see  Saldanha  (in  this  volume).-8-
nominal  anchors,  b) full  price  liberrlization,  c) tight  monetary  and  fiscal
policies.  In both -ases,  the  inflation  rate  in  January  was  extremely  high,  due
to the  sudden  price  liberalization.  In the  subsequent  months  inflation  dropped
gradually  and  by mid-yerr  the inflation  rate  had 'ropped  dramatically.  In
December  the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  inflation  rates  were about  6% and 3%  on a
monthly  basis.  Output  contract  d sharply  without  a parallel  decrease  in
employment,  and, as a consequence,  the  real  wage  was drastically  reduced.
Exports  soared,  as domestic  demand  contracted,  and  producers  would  rather
export  than  sell to domestic  buyers  since  the  latter  frequently  defaulted  on
payments.
After  more than  one  year  has elapsed  from  the  date of implementation
o£ the  Polish  and  Yugoslav  plans,  the  perspectives  for  Poland  and  Yugoslavia
look  grim.  The reaction  to  the stabilization  programs  was a general  shrinkage.
Industrial  output  dropeed  by 20% in Poland  and 10%  in  Yugoslavia.Self-managed
enterprises  would  rather  cut  ,,es  than "fire"  its  members,  hence  there  was no
parallel  increase  in  unemployment. 3 Since  the  capital  stock  is "socially"
owned,  it could  not  be traded  and  rationally  rearranged  by en,repreneurs.  The
two  economies  remained  ossified,  and  did  not  undergo  deep  structural  changes.
One important  difference  between  the  two  programs  is  that Poland
started  the  year with a  highly  undervalued  currency,  while in  Yugoslavia  the
dinar  was  probably  :,t  too  much out  of line  with its  market  value in  January
1st. Since  the  exchange  rates  of the  two  countries  remained  fixed,  the  real
exchange  rate  appreciated  considerably  since  then.  In Poland  this  was not  mc  h
of a problem:  the  undervaluation  of the  zloty  was  partially  corrected.  On the
other  hand, the  Yugoslav  dinar  eventually  becat,..  extremely  overvUlued.  This
forced  the  Yugoslav  government  to devalue  the  dinar  by 28% on  Janury  1st.,
3The  unemployment  rate in Yugoslavia  remained  around  10  percent.  In Poland,
the  official  rate increased  from  1 percent  to 7.5  percent.  The statistics  are
however  misleading  in this  case  due  to the  new  possibility  of earning
unemployment  benefits..9-
1991.  The expectation  is that  the  inflation  rate  will,  as a consequ4nce,  jump
to about  12%  per  month.
The export  performance  of  both countries  was  good.  Faced  with
declining  domestic  demand  and  with  difficulties  of collecting  from  domestic
clients,  producers  in  both countries  turned  to foreign  markets.  Given tne
favorable  exchange  rate,  Polish  firms  made  huge  profits  in the first  months  of
1990.  Since  the  dinar  was ove-valued,  Yugoslav  firms  exported  at a loss.  The
alternative  would  be to stop  production  and lay  off  workers.  This  might  have
been the  optimal  policy  of a capitalist.  For  workers,  it  was  better  to
continue  thp  firm's  operation,  eat  up the  firm's  capital,  and keep receiving
wages.  The firm's  capital  that  was and  is cor..umed  in the  process  consisted  of
the  depreciation  funds  and foreign  currency  reserves  that  had  been accumulated
abroad.
Poland  also  benefited  from  superior  wage restraint  in the  initial
months  of the  plan.  Due  to the  partial  wage indexation  scheme,  real  wages fell
by more than 30%  in the  first  quarter,  and  only recently  have started  climbing
back to their  previous  levels.  It should  be noted  however  that shortages  have
been eliminated.  In  Yugoslavia  wages  started  increasing  from the  beginning  of
the  program,  as the  republics  did  not  comply  with the  wage restraint  measures
imposed  by the  federal  government.
The  number  of bankruptcies  in Poland  during  1990  was insignificant:
only  six  were reported.  Several  factors  contributed  to enhance  the
profitability  of Polish  firms.  The  undervalued  exchange  rate  was favorable  to
exporters,  and  energy,  t.  only  economically  significant  imported  input,  was
subsidized.  In contrast,  there  were  hundreds  of banb.ruptcies  in  Yugoslavia,
where  the  exchange  rate  was overvalued  and  restrictions  on  wage raises  were
not respected.  Only  a handful  of these  enterprises  were actually  liquidated,
and  most remain  operating.  Small  enterprises  in difficulties  turned  to the
local  authorities  for  help,  and  received  subsidies.  Medium  and large- 10-
enterprises  were  bailed  out  by the  republican  governments.  In  both cases  deals
that  amounted  to debt forgiveness  were  struck  with suppliers.  1
The  private  sector  now enjoys  greater  freedoms  in  Poland  and
Yugoslavia,  but its  activities  remain  mar_'nal.  Private  sector  investments  are
concentrated  in trade,  agriculture  and  services,  and  are  usually  small  scale
efforts.  Several  factors  have adversely  affected  private  sector  development.
The  situation  of general  economic  distress,  and the  possibility  of a  political
regression  are  not favorable  to investment.  Private  sector  enterpi  wes  have to
compete  with  public  enterprises  for  inputs,  and  face  discrimination .fom
public  sector  suppliers.  A similar  situation  obtains  with  regards  to credit,
with one  aggravating  feature.  Many  banks  have  become  hostages  of their  clients
in the  public  sector,  and cannot  stop  lending  to them  under  penalty  of
bankruptcy.  Credit  to pri-ate  enterprises  is  therefore  crowded  out.
It is  worthwhile  comparing  macroeconomic  developments  in EE and  Latin
America.  In  both regions  large  consolidated  public  sector  deficits  led  to  high
iaflation.  However,  these  deficits  had very  different  causes.  Ir Latin
American)  countries  most  producti-e  activity  is  conducted  by the  private
sector,  which  is relatively  efficient.  The  deficits  were due to  problems
specific  to the  public  sector,  in  particular  to  overbloated  civil  services,
and  to inefficient  public  enterprises  that  sometimes  overpaid  their  staffs,
and  had to be subsidized.  These  problems  were,  so to say, localized.  In
contrast,  inefficiency  is  pervasive  to the  whole  economic  structure  in  EE.
Moreover,  inefficiency  is  not  restricted  to thu  enterprise  level:  the  whole
allocation  of resources  is irrational,  as investment  decisions  are  made  by
bureaucrats  who are subject  to perverse  incentive  schemes,  ignore  economic
principles,  and  do not  have access  to  market  signals.
4
4Kimme  and  Crane (1984)  measure  the  gap  between  potential  and  actual  output
due to  productive  inefficiencies  at 35  percent  for  the  seventies.The Inherent  Instability  of Market  Socialism.
It has  been frequently  argued  that  two ingredients  have been  missing
in the  reforming  EE economies:  financial  discipline  and  competition.  With
these  two  ingredients,  goes  the  argument,  efficiency  would increase  and the
demands  of population  for  better  standards  of living  could  be satisfied
without  the  need to run  trade  or  budget  deficits.  Our  point  of  view is that
this  argument  overlooks  the fundamental  differences  that  exist  between
capitalist  and socialist  economies.
The usual  argument  for  socialism  is  based  on its  greater  equity:  the
income  and  wealth  distributions  are  compressed  in  comparison  with capitalism.
If our  point  of  view is  correct,  there  is a trade  off  between  equity  and
efficiency,  in the  sense  that  a price  in terms  of efficiency  has to  be paid
for  socialism's  advantages  in terms  of equity.  While  equity  may  be desirable,
ultiniately,  what is to  be achieved  is a  high standard  of living  for the
population  of the  EE countries.  If the  losses  from  having  a certain  level  of
economic  equality  are  too  large,  then  it  may  be worthwhile  to allow  for
greater  inequali:y.  One  can  hope that  the  most  disadvantaged  will also  benefit
from it,  but the  change  may  be worthwhile  even  if this  does  not turn  out  to be
the  case.
In any  economy  where the  survival  of large  numbers  of enterprises  has
been since  long  ensured  by subsidies,  the  imposition  of financial  discipline
is  bound  to generate  much disruption.  Many enterprises  would  have to close,
and  unemployment  would  increase  dramatically.  Faced  with economic  prices  and  a
liberalized  environment  entrepreneurs  would  then  reorganize  economic  activity,
creating  wealth  and  employment.  The  process  would  be painful,  but  beneficial
in the  long  run,  and the  period  of  hardship  would  be short.  In contrast,  in  a
market  socialist  economy  there  would  be no supply  response.  The short  run
adverse  effects  of financial  discipline  would  not  disappear.  One can imagine
that,  as governments  become  aware  of this lack  of supply  response  they  will-12-
naturally  relax  the  discipline  that  they  were so eager  to impose  before.
Why is it that  market  socialist  economies  are  bound  to respond
perversely  to an environment  that  would  stimuiate  growth  for  a capitalist
economy?  The  problem  lies  at the  level  of  microeconomic  incentives.  There  are
two  main  problems:  ownership  dilution  and  the  non-negotiability  of streams  of
rents.
a. Ownership  Dilution
Socialist  enterprises  are, in  a way, "owned"  by society  as a whole.  A
higher  level  of efliciency  of the  enterprise  sector  would  be reflected  in
higher  standards  of living  for  the  population  as a whole.  This linkage  between
efficiency  and  welfare  only exists  at the  aggregate  level.  Variations  in the
efficiency  level  of a particular  enterprise  have  very little  effect  on the
welfare  of  most individuals.  The  exceptions  are the  workers  and  managers  of
the  enterprise.  But  these  individuals  may also  benefit  if the  enterprise
adopts  courses  of action  that  are  not  optimal  from  the  point  of view of  value
and  efficiency.  Managers  want  to build  empires,  so they  will have enterprises
overinvest.  They  may also  favor  some suppliers  or clients  over  others  in
exchange  for  side  payments.  Workers  want to  earn  high  wages.  So labor  competes
with capital  for  the  revenues  of enterprises.  In the  absence  of large
shareholders  that  have strong  incentives  to counteract  the  pressure  for  higher
wages the  enterprise  may  be decapitalized:  funds  that  could  be used for
maintenance,  replacement,  or investment  are  paid  up as wages.
b. Imperfect  Appropriability  of rents
A share  of a capitalist  enterprise  gives  to its  owner  the  right  to
receive  future  streams  of payments  (dividends)  that  correspond  to rents  on
capital.  In capitalist  economies  individuals  freely  trade  such  streams,  but
they  are,  by definition,  forbidden  to do so in  market  socialism.  At the  same
time,  individuals  do collect  rent  payments  in  market  socialism.  Workers  in
capital  intensive  or monopolistic  firms  receive  higher  "wages"  than  others.-13-
Conceptually,  this  means  that  their  "wages"  can  be divided  into  two  parts,  one
being  the  wage proper,  and the  other  rents  on capital  or monopoly  power.
However,  this  second  portion  cannot  be traded.  This severely  distorts
incentives,  because  the  workers  are finite-lived.  That is,  they  will try  to
shift  the  time  patterns  of the  streams  of rent  payments  generated  by their
enterprises  towards  the  period  of their  tenure.  The  way to do this  is to
underspend  in  maintenance,  replacement,  and investment,  and  to pay themselves
high wages.  There  is some  conflict  of interests  between  young  workers,  who may
expect  to remain  with the  firm  for  an extended  period  of time,  and  older
workers,  who expect  to  retire  soon,  but in  any  case the  incentives  are to
underinvest  and let  the  capital  stock  deteriorate.
The non-negotiability  of future  streams  of rents  has other  adverse
effects  on incentives.  Incumbent  workers  will  be hesitant  to admit  new  workers
in their  enterprises,  as this  would  lead  to the  dilution  of their  rents.  As a
result,  labor  mobility  is severely  reduced.  For  the  same  reason,  workers
choose  highly  capital  intensive  technologies.
Having  their  rent  payments  attached  to  their  paychecks  also increases
uncertainty  for  workers.  In case  their  enterprises  fail  they  lose  both their
jobs and  their  "investments."  In such  circumstances  workers  will fiercely
resist  plant  closures  and  lay-offs.  The  unwillingness  of  workers  to accept
closures  and lay-offs  is increased  by their  inability  to appropriate  the  scrap
value  of their  enterprises.  A capitalist  will  compare  that  scrap  value  with
the  net  present  value  of the  stream  of future  dividends  he expects  to receive
from  a plant,  and  close  down in case  the  former  greater  than  the latter.
Workers  will compare  the  future  wages  they  expect  to receive  with their  best
alternative,  which  may  be unemployment  compensation,  a chance  of finding
another  job, or nothing  at all.  Only rarely  will the  second  alternative  be the
most  attractive.-14-
II.  The  Transition  to a Market  Economy.
The experience  of EE countries  suggests  that  democratic  forms  of
socialism  are even  less  efficient  than  the  old  central  planning  system,  which
was  no paragon  of efficiency  itself.  Hence,  it is  unlikely  that  economic
efficiency  can  be significantly  increased  in  these  countries  without  a radical
transformation  of ownership  relations.  For  the  EE countries  to attain  the
level  of efficiency  of the  developed  capitalist  countries,  they  must first
establish  private  property  as the  cornerstone  over  which  a whole  network  of
new economic  relations  will be built.
Stabilization  and  Adjustment.
In the  previous  section  it  was  argued  that  the  problems  of
macroeconomic  instability  faced  by the  EE socialist  economies  have as its
fundamental  cause  the  productive  inefficiency  of these  economies.  As a result,
the  EE countries  will  only achieve  macroeconomic  stability  after  they  have
gone through  a massive  privatization  process.  This  has important  consequences
for  the  choice  of reform  sequencing.
It is often  argued  in  policy  circles  that  macroeconomic  stabilization
should  precede  structural  reform. 5 But if  social  ownership  of the  means  of
production  is the  ultimate  cause  of macroeconomic  instability,  then
stabilization  can  only come  after  or together  with  privatization.  It is true
that  some  of the  external  features  of macroeconomic  stability  can  be
temporarily  mimicked  by imposing  strict  credit  and  fiscal  controls.  This  was
actually  done in  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  in  1990.  However,  the  stability  thus
attained  is fictitious  and  precarious.
Attempts  at establishing  competition  and  imposing  financial  discipline
are  bound to fail  in those  countries  where  the  stock  of capital  has no owners.
The structure  of incentives  precludes  the  efficiency  gains  that  could  be
achieved  by imposing  discipline  in  a capitalist  economy.  The  lack  of a supply
5For  a discussion,  see  Fisher  and  Gelb (1990).-15-
response  to disciplinary  measures  creates  unsustainable  situations:  market
socialism  is inherently  an unstable  economic  system.
One  can make  an analogy  with previous  misguided  attempts  to stabilize
Latin  American  economies  through  the  imposition  of price  controls.  In  both
cases  the  underlying  causes  of instability  were  not  eliminated,  but strong
disciplinary  measures  created  a semblance  of stability.  The Latin  American
programs  failed  as it  became  impossible  to continue  enforcing  discipline.  The
EE programs  will  most likely  suffer  a similar  fate.
Successful  stabilization  is  only  possible  with successful
privatization,  and  conversely.  This  means  that  privatization/stabilization
programs  will have to  be implemented  in  a relatively  short  period  of time.  The
target  for  each  country  should  be to  have  at least  50  percent  of the  economy
privately  owned  five  years  from  now. This  realization  is  more important  than
the specification  of an "optimal  sequencing,"  and  has important  implications
for the  choice  of privatization  method. 6
The  Importance  of Politics.
Granted  that  rapid  privatization  is  necessary  in EE, it is true  that
the  obstacles  are formidable.  The  old  bureaucracies  still  have considerable
control  over the  productive  and  administrative  structures,  and  privatization
would take  away  many  of their  privileges.  Many  privatized  enterprises  would
reduce  employment  and resist  wage increases,  others  would  be closed  down.
Hence,  large  numbers  of workers  would  face  temporary  reductions  in their
incomes  immediately  after  a massive  privatization  program.  These  groups  could
oppose  privatization.
It is important  to distinguish  between  the  bureaucracy  and the  workers
with regards  to their  motivations  to resist  privatization.  Bureaucrats,  as a
6The  debate  on the  optimal  speed  of reforms  is far  from  conclusive.  See  for
eg. Dornbush  (1990),  Williamson  (1990)  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1990)  for  a review
of the issues  involved.-16-
group,  necessarily  have less  power  and  control  over  an economy  based  on
private  ownership  of the  means  of  production.  Although  the  most intelligent,
entrepreneurial,  and  competent  of them  may  benefit  from  privatization,  most
bureaucrats  are  just average  individuals  who  would  descend  socially,  although
not  necessarily  economically,  in  a more  meritocratic  society.  Bureaucrats  are
thus  essentially  in  opposition  to privatization.  Also,  it could  be very
difficult  to "bribe"  them  out of this  attitude,  as any large  transfers  to this
group  would  cause  a public  outcry.
Privatizatior,  will  certainly  benefit  workers  in the  long  run.  They  c-
not enjoy  significant  perks,  privileges,  or the  joys of exercising  power.  It
is the  fear  of the  hardships  of transition  that  leads  them  to cling  to the  old
system.  The  way to  overcome  this  fear is  to give to  workers  a guarantee  that
they  will have a minimum  income  during  the  transition  period.  This  can  be
accomplished  through  the  establishment  of a social  safety  net. Ensuring  a
iminimum  income  for  the  unemployed  is  costly.  Workers  are likely  to lobby
against  reform  unless  they  expect  the  safety  net to function  properly,  an
unlikely  event  unless  governments  are  perceived  to  be rich  enough.
Pre-conditions  for  Efficient  Private  Sector  Development.
Assuming  that  the  political  difficulties  are  overcome,  the  pre-
conditions  for  private  sector  development  must  also  be present.  A new legal
and regulatory  environment  must  be established.  Accounting  rules  must be in
conformity  with western  standards.  Private  enterprises  must interface  with a
healthy  financial  system,  charging  positive  real  interest  rates.  The fiscal
burden  must be moderate.  The  economy  must  be open,  and  the  exchange  rate  must
remain  competitive.  Enterprises  must  be free  to set  prices,  but the  inflation
rate  must remain  low  since  the information  content  of prices  is  crucial  for
entry  and  exit decisions.  But some inflation  might  be needed  in the  initial
phase  of the reforms  in  order  to  eliminate  the  monetary  overhang  and  adjust
relative  prices.-17-
A very important  component  of the  privatization/stabilization  plan is
the  reform  of the  financial  system.  The role  to  be played  by the  financial
system  in the  ocess  is  a dual  one.  Banks  must  allocate  financial  resources
to efficient  enterprises,  and they  must impose  financial  discipline  to prevent
and stop inefficiency.  However,  the  current  state  of  banks'  portfolios  may
prevent  the  banks from  performing  either  of these  functions.  In some  countries
there  are also  ownership  links  between  banks  and  enterprises:  this  problem  is
particularly  serious  in  Yugoslavia,  where  many enterprises  own  banks.
Many banks  in EE countries  have problem  portfolios.  Credits  to
inefficient  enterprises  have  been systematically  rolled  over or forgiven,  so
that  a large  part  of the  banks'  assets  is fictitious.  This  was unavoidable.  In
most socialist  countries  there  are  almost  unsurmountable  legal  and
administrative  obstacles  to the  attachment  of borrowers  assets,  and  bankruptcy
is frequently  explicitly  or implicitly  forbidden.  Even if those  obstacles  are
discounted,  a  beik that  would  refuse  to roll  over  the  debts  of its  borrowers
would  drive  them  and  itself  into  bankruptcy,  a most  undesirable  outcome  from
the  point  of  view of the  bank's  management.  As banks  lost  the  freedom  to
refuse  rolling  over  bad  debts  they  also  became  incapable  of allocating
resources  properly.  That  is,  the  most inefficient  enterprises  are "crowding
out" the  most efficient  (or  least  inefficient)  ones.
The portfolios  of  banks  must therefore  be cleaned  up from  bad loans,
and the  ownership  linkages  between  banks  and  enterprises  must  be cut, if the
financial  systems  of EE countries  are to  perform  their  functions  efficiently.
How to  Privatize  ?
There  is an ongoing  debate  on the  issue  of the  method  of privatization
that suits  better  the  EE socialist  countries. 7 Most  people  agree  that small
enterprises  should  be sold  for  the  highest  bid.  With regards  to large  and
7For  a survey,  see  Dhanji  and  Milanovic  (1990),  Sadanha  and  Milanovic  (1990),
and Borensztein  and  Kumar (1990).-18-
medium  enterprises  opinions  are  more divided.  There  are  two  main  positions:
those  who advocate  privatization  through  free  share  distribution,  and  those
who  prefer  sales.  Each  method  has its  advantages  and  disadvantages.
Share  distribution  is  equitable,  does  not require  enterprise
valuation,  and  can  be implemented  in  a short  period  of time.  Most proposals
along  this  line  assign  an important  role to financial  intermediaries  that
would  hold the  shares  of enterprises  and  would  initially  be owned  by the
population.  What  would  be distributed  would  be shares  in these  trusts  or
vouchers  that  could  te traded  for  such  shares.  The  main  disadvantage  of share
distribution  is that  the  state  collects  no revenues.  Also,  ownership  would  be
diluted  among  millions  of ultimate  owners  (the  unit trusts  being  just
intermediaries).  This  means  that  at least  initially  there  would  be no large
shareholders  that  would  monitor  managerial  behavior.
Privatization  through  sales  has  been successfully  implemented  in
countries  like  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  Tunisia.  In some
cases  the  net revenues  accrued  to the  State  were considerable  (U.K.),  while in
others  they  were small  (Tunisia).  In  most  cases  the  privatized  enterprises
were acquired  by large  or  medium-sized  corporations.  Canada  was an exception:
there  some  enterprises  were sold  to large  numbers  of small  investors.  From  the
point  of view of economic  efficiency  the  first  alternative  is the  preferred
one,  since  large  shareholders  have the  incentive  to monitor  managerial
performance.
One  disadvantage  of privatization  through  sales  is its  slowness.  In
the  United  Kingdom  about  a dozen  enterprises  were  privatized  in ten  years,
despite  the  Thatcher  government's  dogged  determination.  The  main stumbling
blocks  were related  to  concerns  about  fairness  and  income  distribution.  There
is strong  opposition  to selling  the  state  assets  cheap.  Hence  careful
enterprise  valuation  is  needed,  which is time  consuming.  In EE this  problem  is
more serious  since  the  only groups  that  have the  resources  to  buy enterprises-19-
in  EE are  foreigners  and  the  nomenklaturd.  If foreigners  are excluded  from the
process  for  political  reasons,  th1  nomenklatura  would  not  have the resources
to buy the  enterprises  at fair  prices.
Another  important  issue  in EE relates  to the  financing  of
privatization.  Existing  private  wealth  is low  compared  to the  present  value  of
state  assets.  As a result,  the  state  will  have to sell  assets  on credit.  This
would  however  lead to large  debt  to equity  ratios,  reducing  the  incentives  of
firms  to  behave  in an efficient  manner  (see  below).  The debate  goes  on.
Whatever  the  method  preferred,  it is crucial  that  most  assets  now  owned  by the
State  be passed  on to the  private  sector  in the  next  decade.
III.  Private  Sector  Efficiency  and Foreign  Finance
The initial  conditions  of the  privatization/adjustment  drive  are
mixed.  The  EE economies  have several  characteristics  that  can foster  growth,
especially  the  relative  high level  of education  of their  population,  the
proximity  to the  European  market,  an industrial  tradition,  and low  level  of
wages.  On the  negative  side,  entrepreneurship  is  hampered  by ill  defined
property  rights,  the  scarcity  of  private  wealth,  scarce  liquidity,  and a  poor
command  of  modern  accounting,  managerial  and technological  skills.  The  burden
of accumulated  foreign  debt and  the  recent  external  shocks  are likely  to  be
destabilizing  at the  macroeconomic  level.  The  overhang  of official  debt is  an
impediment  to new international  borrowings  by the  emerging  private  sector.
In this  section,  we first  describe  the  burden  of the  past.  We then
discuss  the  microeconomic  conditions  for  private  sector  development  and the
factors  that  are likely  to inhibit  the formation  of private  contracts  with
foreign  firms.
Macroeconomic  Imbalances
The  public  liabilities  of EE countries  are large.  First,  the  servicing
of the  accumulated  external  debt requires  public  funds.  Second,  a safety  net
needs  to be established  and  the  environment  cleaned,  further  increasing  the-20-
demand  for  public  finance.  Third,  investments  in  public  goods--communication
systems,  roads,  new institutions--are  necessary  for  a resumption  of growth.
Fourth,  the  dismantling  of the  CMEA  trade  system  and the  recent  rise in oil
prices  adds  additional  pressures.  On the  revenue  side,  tax  revenues  are
expected  to remain  low  until  a supply  response  materialLes.
In the  absence  of debt  relief  and  the  provision  of new external
finance,  public  sector  deficits  may  have to  be financed  by money  creation,
domestic  debt,  and  taxes.  Monetization  of the  deficits  is likely  to lead to
high inflation,  thus  weakening  the  signalling  content  of  prices  and generating
capital  flight.  Increasing  public  indebtedness  leads  to a rise  of real
interest  rates  and  crowds  out  private  investment.  In  addition,  the ib,plied
expectations  of higher  future  taxes  distort  private  behavior  and  reduces
productive  efficiency.  Finally,  raising  taxes  will not  raise  much revenue
before  the  supply  response  materializes.  In  addition,  a  high tax  rate  distorts
incentives  and  reduces  productive  efficiency.
External  debts
The  overall  convertib'e  currencies  debts  of the  EE countries
(excluding  East  Germany)  are  estimated  to be about  $155  billion  in 1990.  The
Soviet  Union  and Poland  account  by themselves  of 60 percent  of this  total.  By
international  standards,  the absolute  level  of EE debt is  relatively  small
(Mexico  and  Brazil  together  have roughly  the  same  amount  of debt),  and thus
have attracted  less  attention  in the  international  community.  There  are  vast
differences  between  the  six  countries  in  terms  of creditworthiness,  financing
sources  and  debt  burdens.  Three  countries,  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Poland  are
highly  indebted  by world  standards;  two  other  countries,  Romania  and
Czechoslovakia  have very little  foreign  debts.  And one  country,  Yugoslavia  is
moderately  indebted.  The secondary  market  prices  of those  debts  illustrate
well their  relative  creditworthiness:  Hungarian  debt  trades  in the  nineties,
indicating  the  market  belief  in its  creditworthiness  despite  large  debt-21-
ratios.  Yugoslavia's  debt trades  in the  mid-fifties,  followed  by Bulgaria  and.
Poland  (15-20).  (see  appendix  1 for  details).
Ezpected  Shocks
Resource  constraints  are  compounded  by the  large  costs imposed  by the
dismantling  of the  CMEA trade  system.  Estimates  are  available  for  Poland,
Hungary  and  Yugoslavia.
o  The  dismantling  of the  CMEA trade  system  will impose  a terms  of trade  shock
due  the  reliance  of EE countries  on exports  of manufactured  goods  to,  and
import  of raw  material  from  the  Soviec  Union.  The total  cost  is estimated  for
these  countries  at about  $5  billion  for  the  period  1990-92.
o  The recent  oil  shock  due to the  Gulf crisis  will also take  its  toll for
three  reasons:  first,  EE countries  rely  on oil imports  (but  oil  prices  have
declined  soon  after  the  beginning  of the  crisis);  second,  several  of them  have
extended  large  credits  to the  Middle  East  and  to Iraq,  and  those  claims  are
unlikely  to  be serviced  as long  as the  Gulf  crisis  is  not resolved;  third,
workers  remittances  from  nationals  working  in  Iraq  are likely  to dry  up. In
all,  they  are  likely  to lose  about  $6.5  billion.
The  New Corporate  Finance  and  the  Role  of Foreign  Investors
The  modern  corporation  is  a web  of contracts  between  shareholders,
management,  debtholders,  staff,  and  society  at large,  and its level  of
productive  efficiency  is  heavily  dependent  on the  way in  which  potential
conflicts  of interest  between  these  various  groups  are  dealt  with. 8
A classical  example  of a conflict  of interest  is that  between
shareholders  and  creditors  with regards  to the  undertaking  of risky  projects.
Shareholders  of highly  leveraged  firms  will only  be rewarded  in the  good  state
of nature--those  states  where  the  return  on investment  exceeds  the fixed
obligations  of the firm.  This creates  incentives  for  the  shareholders  to  play
8For  a good review  of the  finance  litterature  on agency  problems  within  firms,
see  Barnea,  Haugen  and  Senbet  (1985).-22-
go-for-broke  strategies  and  to invest  in  risky  projects,  possibly  with
negative  net present  value ("moral  hazards",  in  the terminology  of modern
corporate  financial  theory).  In  bad states,  the  return  to  shareholders  would
be zero  anyway,  so higher  risk  allows  for  some  return  in the  lucky  states.
Shareholders  of  highly  leveraged  firms  have also  incentives  to  distribute
large  dividends  and invest  below  the  economically  efficient  level  because  it
is the  debtholders--and  not themselves--  that  are the  most likely
beneficiaries  of the  investment  returns.  As a result  of thi  moral  hazard
created  by large  indebtedness,  rational  lenders  will require  large  interest
rates  to lend,  reducing  the  scope  for  efficient  investment.
Another  important  agency  problem  is adverse  selection,  i.e  the
impossibility  to discriminate  between  good  and  poor investment  projects.  A
good  project  is one  with  high probability  of large  returns  and low  probability
of low  returns.  One  would  hope and  expect  that  market  forces  would  direct
investments  to the  good  projects,  and  lead to  a rejection  of the  bad  ones.
However,  even  quite  bad  projects  have a  positive  expected  gain for
entrepreneurs  under  100%  leveraging  since  they  do not  stand  to lose  anything
if large  returns  do not  materialize,  but can  expect  gains  if luck  strikes.  To
illustrate,  suppose  that  entrepreneurs  do not  have  any  personal  funds  and  that
lending  rates  are fixed.  Then  entrepreneurs  with  good and  bad projects  will  be
equally  at the  doorsteps  of  banks  asking  for loans.  If the  banks  are  unable  to
distinguish  between  good  and  bad projects,  the  financial  system  would simply
not  work.
If the  entrepreneurs  have some  wealth  to invest  in their  projects,
moral  hazard  and adverse  selection  problems  are  alleviated.  By investing  his
own funds,  the  entrepreneur  signals  his belief  in  the  value  of the  project
since  he stands  to lose  funds  in  the  event  of failure.  Aware  of this,  the
lender  is likely  to  revise  his  prior  distribution  of total  returns  for the
project  so as to assign  higiler  probabilities  to  high returns  and  full-23-
repayment.
There  are  also important  conflicts  of interest  between  shareholders
and  management.  The latter  have firm-specific  human  capital,  and  therefore
tend  to  be more risk  averse  than  shareholders  that  can  diversify  their
holdings.  Managers  also  have a tendency  to  build  empires  (maximize  size,  not
value),  and  may shirk  and  give themselves  perks.  The separation  of ownership
and  control  that  prevails  in large  corporations  can thus  be a source  of
inefficiencies.  Shareholders  have incentives  to  monitor  managers,  but there
are  costs involved.  For  small  shareholders  the  optimal  amount  of information
gathering  will  be smaller.  A small  shareholder  that is  dissatisfied  with
management  policies  typically  "votes  with  his feet,"  i.e.,  sells  his stock
instead  of attempting  to change  management  or its  policies  by participating  in
the  General  Assembly.  Large  shareholders  in  contrast  will spend  much  time  and
money  on monitoring  management.  Small  shareholders  therefore  act  as free
riders,  leaving  to large  shareholders  the  monitoring  task.  The existence  of
large  shareholders  also  facilitates  the  functioning  of the takeover  market,
which  further  disciplines  management  and increases  the  efficiency  of the
corporate  form  of governance.
The  weaknesses  of the  corporate  form  discussed  above  are  especially
relevant  in the  EE countries.  First,  the  lack  of experience  of economic  agents
with conflict  resolution  skills  reduces  the  effectiveness  of contracts  as a
means  to reduce  conflicts  of interests.  Second,  the  scarcity  of private  wealth
makes it  hard for  the  financial  system  to allocate  funds  efficiently.  Third,
the  even  distribution  of  wealth  precludes  large  ownership  stakes  by any
individual,  exacerbating  managerial  inefficiencies.
There  are  also  potential  conflicts  of interest  between  society  and
corporate  owners.  The optimal  amount  of risk  a firm  chooses  to take (for
examplc,  the risk  of  oil  spi]ls)  is  unrelated  to the  optimal  amount  of risk  a
society  is  willing  to face.  Firms,  because  of limited  liability,  care  only so-24-
much since  the  cost of cleaniuig  up the  mess they  might  leave  behind  will  have
to be borne  by all  taxpayers,  while  they  can  expropriate  all the  benefits  of
their  investment  in  case of good  luck.  Similarly,  insured  thrift  institution
take  too  many risks,  and so do firms  that  expect  to be bailed  out in  case of
failure.  All this  raises  difficult  questions  about  optimal  regulation  that  are
still  quite  poorly  understood.
What  Role for  Foreign  Firms?
F:om  the  above  discussions,  it  appears  clearly  that  the  role  of
foreign  firms  in  the transition  period  is likely  to  be crucial.  Their
involvement  can  reduce  microeconomic  inefficiencies  and  macroeconomic
imbalances.  Foreign  involve-ment  with the  emerging  private  sector  will  also
reinforce  the  political  lobbies  favorable  to change.
The  liquidity  needs  of the  EE countries  are  large.  And so are  their
need for  wealthy  investors  and large  shareholders  that  have the  right
incentives  to transfer  the  technological,  contracting  and  managerial  expertise
that is  available  in the  West into  countries  where  private  initiative  has  been
outlawed  for  four  decades  or more.  But  while  foreign  capital  ownership  creates
efficiency  gains,  it  also involves  another  layer  of potential  conflicts  with
domestic  shareholders  and  bondholders,  and  with society  at large.  Because
domestic  entrepreneurs  are  likely  to  be liquidity  constrained  and  less
diversified  than  foreign  investors,  their  own  valuation  of domestic  assets
will fall  below  foreign  investors'  valuation.  A public  outcry  will certainly
oppose  what  would  be perceived  as fire-sales  of  public  assets  to foreigners.
The issue  that  arises  then  is  how the  EE countries  can sell  assets  to foreign
investors  at prices  that  are  closer  to the  foreign  (and  higher)  valuation  of
the  expected  cash-flows.
In the  present  circumstances,  foreign  investors  are  unlikely  to invest
before  the  uncertainty  concerning  the  definition  of their  property  rights  is
resolved.  These  concerns  are  being  debated  now  by most  parliaments  in these-25-
countries,  but the  outcome  remains  uncertain.  An important  issue  concerns  the
rights  to convert  domestic  earnings  into foreign  exchange  in  order  to
repatriate  them.  Large  uncertainties  loom there  due to the  overhang  of
official  debts  that inflict  some  of those  countries.  True,  most  of the
outstanding  debt is  public  and  owned  to public  entities  that  have been
faithfully  recapitalizing  all interest  bills  coming  due in the  context  of the
Paris  club.  The problem  here is that  the  relative  seniority  of public  and
private  debtors  is  not--and  cannot--be  well defined.  The  official  sector  can
decide  to adopt  a more  aggressive  posture  in the  future.  As a result,  massive
new private  lending  is unlikely  to  occur  as long  as the  public  debt overhang
has not  been resolved,  especially  in  Poland,  Bulgaria,  and to  a lesser  extent,
in  Yugoslavia  and  Hungary.  For  the  foreign  investor  to  be confident  about
sovereign  risk,  official  creditors  would  have to  commit  not to extract  too
many resources  for  the  indefinite  future.  Debt  reduction  seems  to be the  only
credible  commitment  mechanism.
IV.  Policy  Implications
Overall,  the  EE  countries  will grow  in the  long  run ,f they  are  able
to  maintain  price  flexibiiity  and  some  price  stability  in che  short  term  while
privatizing  quickly.  The  chances  of a good  outcome  are  difficult  to  predict
and  depend  mostly  on the  behavior  of actors  in the  concerned  countries.  We
examine  below  how the  behavior  of the  international  community  affects  the
likely  outcome.
The  discussion  above  suggests  that  a relatively  rapid  privatization
program  is needed,  and that  this  is actually  the  least  painful  alternative  for
the  EE countries.  There  is  an ongoing  debate  about  privatization  in the  EE
countries,  and  there  is  wide  divergence  about  the  speed  and  scope  of the
privatization  effort.  The  balance  of the  political  forces  may  tip  one  way  or
another.  Those  who advocate  a slow,  relatively  painless  privatization  process,
argue  that  rapid  privatization  would  disrupt  the  economic  mechanism.  We argued-26-
that the  opposite  is  actually  true.  It is  social  ownership  of the  means  of
production  in all its  forms  that  has severely  impaired  economic  efficiency.
Moreover,  the  coexistence  of social  and  private  ownership  has  perverse  effects
on incentives.  A slow  process  in  which  private  ownership  would  gradually
replace  social  ownership  would  therefore  lead  to hyperinflation  and
snowballing  indebtedness  (Hinds,  1990).  These  adverse  developments  are
currently  taking  place  in  EE, in the  absence  of strong  privatization  programs.
The arguments  of the  partisans  of quick  privatization  need  not  be repeated
(see  Borenztein  and  Kumar,  1990).  What  emerges  however  is that  massive
privatization  is  unlikely  to occur  without  strong  support  from  the
international  community  and the  IFIs.
One corollary  of the  above  reasoning  is  that the  current
indecisiveness  of EE governments  should  not  be an argument  for  a wait-and-see
attitude  from the  part of the international  financial  institutions  (IFIs).
This is  because  it is  precisely  the intervention  of the  IFIs  and  the
international  community  through  conditionality  and  guarantees  of financial
support  that  could  tip  the  political  scales  to the  side  of the  pro-
privatization  parties.  But  the importance  of strong  conditionality  must  be
stressed.  Foreign  financing  without  the  proper  conditionality  could  backfire
and  actually  delay  the  privatization/stabilization  process.  There  are two
reasons  for  this.  First,  the  social  pressures  for  reform  could  be reduced,  as
the  population  could  be appeased  by the  availability  of cheap  imported  goods.
Second,  the  expected  gains  to  bureaucrats  from  remaining  in control  would
increase,  as they  would  have at their  disposal  larger  sums of money.
The Case  for Debt  Reduction
As in the  case  of corporate  debt,  high external  country  debt creates
moral  hazard.  Domestic  incentives  to reform  are  reduced  since  a large  share  of
the  efficiency  improvement  is  expected  to benefit  the  creditors  rather  than
the reforming  economy  (Sachs  [1990],  Krugman  [1990]).  These  debt  overhang-27-
considerations  are  especially  importanit  for  the  highly  indebted  EE economies
because  the  immediate  cost  of reforms  cannot  be smoothed  entirely  through
international  borrowing.  In the  presence  of a large  public  debt,  the  private
sector  will expect  large  future  taxes,  reducing  incentives  to accumulate
assets.  Moreover,  as long  as a debt  overhang  exists,  the  emerging  private
sector  is  unable  to  contract  credibly  with foreign  investors.  For those
reasons,  the  most productive  use of  Western  governments'  aid in the  highly
indebted  EE countries  would  be to  reduce  the  public  debt overhang.  The goal  of
debt reduction  would  be to facilitate  the  redeployment  of productive  assets
and liabilities  from  the  public  to  private  hands.  The point  is that  a
reduction  in the  stock  of public  debt  would  be a  more efficient  form  of  aid  as
compared  to  new  money  because  it  would  reduce  rather  than  increase  the  debt
overhang  and  thus leave  more room  for the  uncoordinated  formation  of private
contracts.
Unless  Western  governments  want to  keep  pumping  money  in EE for  the
indefinite  future,  they  must seek  to create  conditions  under  which  foreign
capital  can  truly  contribute  to growth  and  prosperity.  Rather  than  flood  the
new governments  with funds  that  would  encourage  the  continuation  of old
spending  habits,  it  would  therefore  be important  for  foreign  donors  to give
sparirgly  to the  public  sector,  and  to attach  conditionality  on new loans  to
encourage  privatizations,  the  formation  of a modern  social  net  and the
financing  of basic  infrastructure.  Macroeconomic  conditionality  can  also
directly  help governments  resist  domestic  pressures  to spend  funds  for
unproductive  purposes.  Official  finance  to  the  public  sector  should  not  be so
large  as to  place  the  new governments  in a situation  where they  would  have to
yield  to the  social  pressures  to save failing  enterprises  or oppose  the
shrinking  of some industries.  Large  official  assistance  to the  EE public
sectors  would  be counterproductive.  It  would  not only  reduce  the  incentives  to
reform  (the  overhang  effect),  but also  unleash  expectations  that soft  budget-28-
constraints  will continue  to  dominate  economic  discipline.
Although  resources  are  needed  in  both the  public  and  emerging  private
sectors,  it is  more  profitable  to  direct  a large  share  of new finance  to the
private  sector.  One reason  is that  the  EE public  sector  are  not in  a good
position  to intermediate  between  foreign  funds  and  domestic  private  needs.  In
effect,  large  official  loans  to the  public  sectors  run  against  the  movement  of
history:  it  would  be ironic  to  provide  incentives  for  renewed  growth  in the
public  sector  in the  name  of supporting  a reform  agenda  whose  main intention
is to reduce  public  intervention  in the  economy. 9
The  public  sectors  of the  EE  countries  will  need finance  to support
the  political  process  as there  is  a risk  of emergence  of  populist  regimes  if
the  social  front  is  not stabilized  during  the  reform  period.  The  productive
restructuring  that is  needed  will no doubt  increase  short  term  unemployment,
and  a social  safety  net is  necessary  to reduce  the  associated  pain,  encourage
workers  mobility,  and  set the  needed  training  programs.  Moreover,  selected
investments  in infrastructure  to  complement  private  investment  is a crucial
element  of any strategy  to revive  growth.  The  point  is that  foreign  aid  in the
form  of debt  relief  is likely  to be the  best  form  of aid.  Debt reduction  will
reduce  the  public  financing  needs.  And if  the  private  sector  can  freely  borrow
abroad  for  productive  purposes,  governments  in EE  will be able to finance
their  own  operations  domestically.  Since  domestic  borrowings  will crowd  out
domestic  private  investment,  it  can  be expected  that  domestic  lobbies  would
rise to limit  the  extent  of future  government  spending.
How far  to Creditworthiness  ?
One question  that  arises  when trying  to foresee  the  medium  to long
term  evolution  of the  the  EE countries  is  how far  they  stand  today  from
creditworthiness,  and  the  extent  of export  growth  and/or  debt  relief  that  is
required  in order  to regain  international  creditworthiness.  For  this  purpose,
-For  a discussion,  see  Brainard,  1989.-29-
we use the  debt  value  function  estimated  by Claessens,  Diwan,  Froot  and
Krugman  (1990).  This function  relates  secondary  market  debt  prices  to the  debt
to exports  ratio (more  generally,  the  extent  of creditworthiness  also  depends
on the  degree  of openness,  on the  general  performance  of the  economy,  on the
existence  of arrears,  etc..).
Typically,  countries  whose  debt  claims  trade  in the  eighties  have
access  to  voluntary  loans  from the  international  markets.  We estimate  below
the  predicted  debt  prices  for  each  country:  with  no debt relief  or export
growth;  with debt  relief  (half  of the  debt  cancelled);  with export  growth
(exports  double).  Finally,  we estimate  the  extent  of debt reduction  that  is
necessary  to regain  voluntary  access  when exports  double.  The results  are
reported  in the  table  below:
X/GNP  D/X  Debt  prices
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Bulgaria  38  230  45  20  76  80  none
Hungary  36  284  48  80  80  80  none
Poland  23  500  15  22  51  52  45 percent
Romania  22  103  98  - none
Czechoslovakia 16  104  80  --  --  --  none
USSR  7  132  80  80  --  --  none
Yugoslavia  30  105  79  55  --  --  none
(1)  predicted  using  the  model;  (2)  actual  price;  (3)  predicted  with 1/2  of
debt forgiven;  (4)  predicted  with doubling  exports;  (5)  debt forgiveness
needed  if  exports  double.
The results  indicate  that--given  the  actual  level  of their  Debt-to-
Export  ratios--the  debts  of Bulgaria  and  Yugoslavia  are  overpriced  by our
model  relative  to their  actual  prices  while  the  debt  of Hungary  is  underpriced
relative  to its  market  value.  The  predicted  price  for  Polish  debt is slightly
above,  but close  to its  observed  market  value.  Various  interpretations  are
possible.  Both Bulgaria  and Poland  are  running  arrears  on their  commercial
debts,  which reduces  their  creditwothiness  further  than  predicted  by the-30-
model.  Bulgaria  has not  just started  stabilizing  its  economy,  and  as a result,
its  future  creditworthiness  is  extremely  uncertain.  Yugoslavia  is somewhat  a
special  case as uncertainties  about  its  future  as a state  abound.  What is more
surprising  is the  observed  high  value  of Hungarian  debt.  Perhaps  because  it
has never  rescheduled  its  debt,  the  market  seems  to  discount  its  very  high
debt  ratios.
Our  model  predicts  that  Bulgaria  regains  creditworthiness  if its  debt
is  reduced  by half,  or if its  exports  double.  But  more needs  to  be done  for
Poland:  if  exports  double,  Poland  still  needs  to  have its  debts  reduced  by 45
percent  in  order  to regain  creditworhtiness.  The  other  countries  are--
according  to  our simulations--marginally  creditworthy.
The  Case  for  Debt Transformation:  Debt to  Equity  Programs
Even if  debt reduction  is  achieved  for  the  highly  indebted  countries
of EE, the  remaining  debt is unlikely  to  allow  for  free  access  to foreign
capital  markets  until  domestic  growth  picks  up.  Efficiency  gains  can  be
created  by changing  the  nature  of the  external  liability  contracts.  In
particular,  foreigners  have larger  incentives  to play  a useful  role in the
productive  sphere  when they  hold  equity  stakes  rather  than  debt.  When foreign
equity  is  unlikely  to flow  in  because  of the  debt  overhang,  it  becomes
profitable  to attempt  to swap  part of the  existing  debts  into  more
"productive"  equity  contracts.
A debt to equity  (DE)  swap transaction  can be  viewed  as two
transactions  that  have  been packaged  together:  first,  a country  subsidizes
foreign  direct  investment  (to  the  extent  that  part of the  discount  on debt is
retained  by the  foreign  ilLvestor);  and  second,  the  proceeds  from the
investment  is  used  by the  government  to  buyback  its foreign  debt at market
price.
A major  criticism  of DE swaps  is that,  in general,  there  are  no good
reasons  to use the  proceeds  of direct  foreign  investment  to retire  debt.-31-
Indeed,  other  uses of the  proceed  can increase  welfare  by more.  This criticism
applies  when government  debt is  retired  for  domestic  money  that is then  used
to  purchase  private  equity.  When public  equity  is instead  purchased,  the
transaction  in  effect  swaps  one  public  liability  (debt)  for  another  (equity).
On a net  basis,  the  government  does  not  have to reduce  expenditures  to finance
the transaction.
Another  criticism  of DE swaps  is that  debt  reduction  involves  a
transfer  of resources  to the  creditors  (Bulow  and  Rogoff,  1988).  This  is due
to the  fact that  the  equilibrium  market  price  of  buybacks  reflects  the
expected  improvement  in creditworthiness  that  follows  debt  reduction.  Thus,
debt  prices  go up before  the  actual  exchange  takes  place.  This is reinforced
when swaps  create  efficiency  gains.  However,  when the  swap  program  is agreed
on as part of an overall  debt  deal,  this  criticism  does  not apply  as the
debtor  can get  concessions  in return  (Diwan  and  Kletzer,  1990).
DE swaps  are then  profitable  to the  debtor  if two  conditions  are
satisfied:  the  swap  must  create  efficiency  gains;  and  the  debtor  must retain
part of those  gains.  There  is no doubt  that  the  first  condition  is satisfied
in EE.  Auctions  of domestic  equity  rights  take  care of the  second  concern  only
partially,  because  all  creditors  gain  when the  debtor's  creditworthiness
improves.  It is thus important  that  the  programs  be part  of an overall
concerted  debc agreement  in  which  the  remaining  creditors  offer  concessions  in
return  for the  improvement  of the  value  of their  claims.
Burden  Sharing  and  Menu Considerations
Since  only private  debts  are traded  on an organized  secondary  market,
it  would  be profitable  for  the  indebted  EE countries  to structure  overall  debt
deals  in  such a  way as to reduce  official  debt  and transform  commercial  debt
into  equity.  Burden  sharing  between  the  official  and  commercial  creditors  can
be achieved  by requiring  that  the  private  creditors  that  choose  not to exit
provide  new loans (as  in the  recent  Mexico  deal for  example).  That commercial-32-
creditors  would  mainly  advance  new money  does  not indicate  that  no burden
sharing  is  accomplished.  New loans  that  are traded  at a discount  immediately
after  they  are  provided  include  an important  element  of concessionality.
If a reduction  of public  debt  owed to  public  creditors  is achieved,
there  would  also  be much less  of a need for  private  debt  reduction.  Two issues
must  be addressed.  First,  those  debts  have been  contracted  by the  public
sector.  A successful  transition  should  involve  the  transfer  of these  debts  to
the  emerging  private  sector,  and their  transformation  into  more  efficient
contracts.  Second,  official  debt  reduction  will increase  the  value  of existing
private  debt,  raising  other  issues  of  burden  sharing.
Both of these  concerns  are  best addressed  in the  context  of the  menu
approach  to debt restructuring.  The  Brady  umbrella  involving  menu driven  deals
for  commercial  debts,  with  an active  support  by the international  community,
can  be very useful  in  EE.1 0 However,  it also  presents  some  clear  dangers.
Burden  sharing  should  not  be taken  to imply  that  commercial  debt reduction  is
needed  when official  debt reduction  is  being  considered,  but rather  that  banks
should  be encouraged  to  provide  new  money  to the  private  sector.  The  banks
that  are already  exposed  to EE are  also those  that  are the  most likely  co
provide  new  money  when the  conditions  would  improve.  Thus,  there  is  a strong
case for  attempting  to  nurture  the  evolving  credit  relation  rather  than  to
severe  it  by negotiating  debt reductions.  New  money  should  not  necessarily
10  The  main features  of the  Brady  Initiative  are  the  following.  Debtor
countries  should  maintain  growth-oriented  adjustment  programs  and  take
measures  to encourage  repatriation  of flight  capital.  The IMF  and  World  Bank
would  provide  funding  for  debt  and debt-service  reduction  through  debt
buybacks,  exchanges  of old  debt  at a discount  for  new (partly)  collateralized
bonds,  and  exchanges  of old  debt  for  new  bonds  at par  value,  with reduced
interest  rates.  Over a three-year  period,  the  Fund  and  the  Bank  are  expected
to provide  up to $20-25  billion.  Japan  is envisaged  to provide  about  $10
billion  over the  next several  years  as additional  financing.  In  principle,
commercial  banks  would  provide  debt reduction  and  new  money,  and support  the
accelerated  reduction  of debt  and  debt  service.  Creditor  governments  would
continue  to reschedule  their  loans  through  the  Paris  Club  and  to maintain
export  credit  cover  for  countries  with sound  reform  programs.  Tax, accounting,
and  regulatory  impediments  to  debt reduction  would  be eliminated.-33-
flow in terms  of new  debt:  it  would  be best to  allow  the  new  sectors  to
directly  negotiate  with foreign  investors  the  type  of contract  that fits  both
their  needs  best.
The  potential  contributions  of those  banks  and  of their  western
clients  to the  development  of the  economic  base in  EE is likely  to be a
crucial  ingredient  of the  reform  program.  It  can thus  be argued  that it  would
be more  valuable  for  EE  countries  to  offer  concessions  to commercial  banks in
order  to encourage  them  to retain--and  even  deepen--their  stakes  in domestic
ventures.  In this  view,  EE countries  would  not  seek large  commercial  debt
reductions,  but would  rather  attempt  to lure  commercial  banks  to transform
their  debts  into instruments  that  would  generate  more incentives  for  direct
involvement  by the  creditors  in the  managerial  decisions  of specific  firms.
One such  strategy  would  be to develop  creative  debt/equity  mechanisms  that
would  be politically  acceptable  in  EE.  Good  mechanisms  are those  that  offer
rewards  to the  banks  that  are  conditional  on an improvement  in the  management
of the  firms  they  invest  in.
How to  organize  official  debt  reduction?  The  difficulties  of a public
sector  debt  reduction  initiative  should  not  be underestimated.  Different
creditor  governments  face  different  institutional.  constraints  in  writing  off
loans  by their  respective  Exim  Banks,  Central  Banks  and  various  involved
ministries.  As with private  debt,  unilateral  actions  are  unlikely  due to the
public  nature  of the  credit  relationship.  After  all,  public  debt is  also
subject  to the  creditworthiness  test:  the  less  debt there  is,  the larger  the
probability  of repayment.  As with the  Baker  plan,  the  need for  fair  burden
sharing  together  with the  constraint  of a unified  policy  followed  by all  has
stalled  the  possibility  of any solution  other  than  repeated  reschedulings.
Differences  between  the  various  public  creditors  involved  militate  for
a menu type  debt reduction  arrangement.  With differences  between  creditors,
burden  sharing  can  best  be imposed  by devising  a menu  of options  creditors  can-34-
freely  choose  from.  This type  of approach  has  been successfully  implemented
for  sub-Saharan  African  countries  within  the  Toronto  agreement.  In this
agreement  creditors  were given  the  choice  between  exiting  and  contributing  new
money.  Such  an arrangement  could  also  be worked  out  for  EE.  Two  main
difficulties  would  however  need to  be resolved:  the  definition  of acceptable
debts,  and the issue  about  the  treatment  of inter-CMEA  debts.  Once these
hurdles  are resolved,  a menu can  produce  gains  as some  creditors  would seek  to
exit,  either  because  they  are  overexposed,  or  because  of liquidity
constraints.  Other  creditors  and the  multilateral  institution  will  want to
lend,  a process  that  would  be reinforced  by the  overall  reduction  in
outstanding  debt.  The result  of the  exercise  would  be to reduce  overall  public
debt  to make room  for the  development  of more  sophisticated  private  contracts.
Ideally,  the  remaining  official  debt  claims  should  be privatized  on
the  creditor  side  of the  relation  as well so they  can  be transformed  into  more
efficient  contracts.  The international  official  sector-Exim  banks,  ministries,
central  banks--have  little  incentives  and technological  knowhow  to  pass on to
their  debtors.  In contrast,  private  lenders  not  only  have incentives  to see
their  debtors  prosper,  but they  also  have the  means  to teach  them  how to  do
it.  It  may  be possible  to privatize  official  loans  in the  donor  countries.  For
example,  the  menu  offered  to official  creditors  can include  rights  to swap
debt into  local  equity.  In turn,  these  rights  can  be sold  by the  official
sector  to private  investors.
Concluding  Remarks:  Sequencing  Considerations
We have argued  that  privatization  of state  assets  is a crucial
component  of reforms  in  EE and that  the  following  initiatives  are  beneficial
to the  reform  process  and in  particular,  would  support  its  privatization
component:  (i)  official  debt  relief;  (ii)  Brady  deal  for  commercial  debts
stressing  new  money  rather  than  debt  reductions;  (iii)  debt  contract
transformation  stressing  debt to equity  swaps.-35-
Sequencing  issues  arise.  In  particular,  debt for  equity  swaps  should
follow  privatizations  in order  to allow  the  new firms  to directly  contract
with their  foreign  counterparts.  Official  debt  relief  should  be conditional  on
the  speed  of the  prizatization  process.  A Brady  type  deal should  preceed  D/E
swap transactions  so that  the  debtor  country  can  extract  equivalent
concessions  from  its  commercial  creditors.  Finally,  Paris  and London  club
deals  should  be simultaneous  enough  to  manage  a fair  burden  sharing. 11
These  considerations  imply  that  ideally  the  sequencing  of the  moves  by
the  foreign  official  and commercial  sectors  would  be as follows:
(i)  The  Paris  club  meets  and  offers  rescheduling  and  debt relief  contingent  on
a  privatization  program.  The deal  offers  a menu  of options,  including  the
pledging  of debts  into  a special  fund  that  would  offer  debt relief  as
privatization  proceeds.
(ii)  At the  same  time (or  soon  afterwards),  the  commercial  banks  negotiate  a
menu driven  deal that  seeks  relatively  more  new  money  than  debt reductions,
and that includes  an auction  driven  debt to  equity  program.
(iii)  As firms  get  privatized,  the  public  sector  retains  some  claim  on the  new
firms.  These  claims  can  be in the  form  of short  term  debt (two  to three
years).  This reduces  further  the  drain  on public  finances,  and  provides  the
new owners  with incentives  to  either  recapitalize  the  firm  with their  own
capital,  or more likely,  to look  for  a fitting  foreign  associate.
(iv)  As debt to  equity  swaps  proceed,  foreign  investors  acquire  domestic  IOUs
that  can  be used to  buy a share  in newly  privatized  firms.  Foreign  investors
negotiate  directly  with the  private  entities,  and their  stakes  are  capitalized
with the IOU.s  they  hold on the  government.  In turn,  these  IOUs  are  used  by the
new firms  to extinguish  their  debts  to the  government.
"For a discussion  centered  on the  case  of Poland,  see  Nuti (1990).
12In case  of default,  the  firm  comes  back  under  state  control  and is
privatized  again.-36-
Appendix:  External  Debt in EE
Bulgaria
The external  debt  situation  in Bulgaria  is precarious.  Its  total
external  debt in convertible  currencies  has  risen  to 9  billion  at the  end  of
1989,  over 3 times  convertible  exports.  The  country's  debt increased  steadily
during  the  eighties:  external  liabilities  doubled  between  1973  and 1985,  and
doubled  again  between  85  and 89,  partly  because  of exchange  rate  movements.
The  combination  of increasing  debt  and  decreasing  hard currencies  export
boosted  the  debt to export  ratio  from  119  in 1985  to 430 in 1989.
Bulgaria's  debt is  heavily  concentrated:  about  83 percent  of total
obligations  are  due to commercial  bank  creditors.  The GOB  announced  on March
1990  that it  was suspending  all  amortization  payments,  and  on June 1990,  it
requested  a 90 days  moratorium  on all  payments  due to the  London  Club.  Short
term  credits  virtually  dried  up and the  country  no longer  has access  to the
international  financial  markets.  While  the  Bulgarian  commercial  Banks  continue
to meet their  debt  service  obligations,  they  have suffered  a contamination
effect  and  have seen  a hardening  of terms  and  conditions.
In the  recent  past,  growing  trade  deficits  resulted  from  convertible
currencies  payments  against  non-convertible  currencies  exports.  But  Bulgaria's
current  payment  difficulties  were  recently  exacerbated  by a severe  bunching  of
maturities  in 1990  and  1991.  Convertible  export  dropped  sharply  partly  because
of the  impossibility  to acquire  imported  inputs.  In 1989,  the  convertible  CA
deficit  amounted  to $1.1  billion,  and  debt  service  payments  absorbed  77
percent  of convertible  currencies  exports.
Bulgaria's  liquidity  problems  have  been compounded  by a substantial
amount  of non-performing  loans  (about  12  billion  in total  trade  credits),  a
large  part of which  are  concentrated  in the  Middle  East.
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia  has  very small  external  debts.  Czechoslovakia's  debt is-37-
mostly  short  term  debt  credits.  Its  debt  problems  are  of an other  nature:  it
has been obliged  to accumulate  as much as 5  billion  of claims  as a result  of
its  exports  to non-socialist  economies,  halt  of which  may  be uncollectible.
Hungary
Hungary's  debt  stocks  have steadily  risen  in the  eighties  while
economic  activity  has stagnated.  By 1989,  Hungary  had about  21  billion  of
external  convertible  currency  debt,  representing  about  78 percent  of GDP  and
2.8  times  exports  (up  from  40 and .9  respectively  in 1980).  Of this 72 percent
are  owed to  private  sources  (about  9 bil  to commercial  banks,  6 bil in  bonds).
Following  a severe  liquidity  crisis  in 1981-82,  Hungary  has  been able
to improve  its  debt  profile  by gradually  substituting  MLT to short  term  debt.
.7nile  Hungary  naver  rescheduled  its  debt  and  managed  to retain  market  access,
current  account  imbalances  and fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  in the  past
three  years  have led  to a rapid  growth  of debt.  But  Hungary's  external
financial  position  has  become  precarious  again  in 1990  in spite  of a strong
improvement  in its  convertible  CA that  can  partially  attributed  to the  ongoing
stabilization  plan.  A substantial  withdrawal  of short  interbank  deposits
(about  500  million)  following  the  Bulgaria  moratorium,  and  an unexpected
repayment  to the  IMF (200  million)  have  caused  a sharp  drop in reserves.  But
in support  of its  stabilization  program,  Hungary  recently  received  about  5
billion  in commitments  from  western  official  sources.
Hungary's  external  situation  will  be difficult  in the  next  years
unless  the  stabilization  program  is  quickly  followed  by a decisive  structural
adjustment  effort.  Amortizations  coming  due  are  about  2  billion  a  year at a
time  where  commercial  financing  seems  to  be drying  out  given  the  low  level  of
anticipated  growth  prospects.
Poland
Current  debt ir.  Poland  is about  43 billion  or about .7  GNP, and  4.5
times  convertible  export.  Poland  has  not  serviced  its  Paris  Cub  debt  since-38-
1981.  It  has accumulated  arrears  on its  commercial  debt  for  about  one  year,
and  has started  discussions  with its  commercial  creditors  about  a debt
reduction  package,  possibly  along  the  lines  of the  Brady  approach.
Poland  debts  are  mostly  medium  and long term  and  are  mostly  owed to
official  sources:  more than  two  thirds  of Poland's  convertible  currency  debt
is owed  to the  Paris  Club;  20  percent  is owed  to commercial  banks,  of  which  90
percent  is  MLT under  the  1988  restructuring  agreement Poland  has  not  had to
service  any  of its  Paris  Club  debt in the  eighties  as all  payments  due  were
rescheduled.  While the  effective  burden  of debt is  expected  to remain  low,  its
debt  overhang  prevents  the  flow  of any  significant  private  capital.
The last  rescheduling  agreement  with -ne  Paris  club in 1990 involved  a
rescheduling  of all  arrears  as of the  end of 1989  and  all  debt service  due
between  Jan 1990  and  March  1991. [3.4  billion  of accumulated  arrears,  plus all
obligations  coming  due in 1990  and in the  first  quarter  of 1991--about  $6
billion--have  been  rescheduled  for  14  years  with  an eight  years  grace  period.]
At the  same time,  it  was  decided  to set  up a  working  group  to  explore  long
term  solutions  to the  Polish  debt  problem.
Poland  is at a crossroads.  The  new Solidarity-led  government  has put
forth  a program  design  to first  stabilize  and then  transform  the  economy  into
a market  system.  A particular  feature  of the  program  is the  availability  of
substantial  foreign  official  assistance.  Official  transfers  are  expected  to  be
about  1 billion  in 1990,  in  addition  to the  transfers  implied  by the  Paris
club reschedulings.  Moreover,  Poland  has  been able  to secure  river  10  billion
dellars  of new  commitments  from  official  western  sources.
But Poland  needs  private  capital  to rebuild  its  economy  at a time  of
large  and ircreasing  debt service  obligations.  Actual  debt service  obligations
after  1991  remain  very  high,  of the  order  of 6-7  billion  a year,  75 percent  of
convertible  exports.  As a result,  Poland's  creditworthiness  is  poor,  and  the
country  is  unable  to raise  money in  private  international  capital  markets,  or-39-
to attract  significant  amounts  of DFI.  This is reflected  in the  price  of its
debt  on the  secondary  market:  in  July 1990,  the  price  of MLT  debt stood  at 15
cents,  and the  price  of short  term  debt (that  is still  serviced)  at 35 cents.
Without  a satisfactory  settlement  of its  debt  problem,  voluntary  private
capital  inflows  will remain  marginal.
Romania
Romania  has  very small  external  debts.  The  Romanian  economy  has  been
stagnating  for  several  years  as a result  of an economic  strategy  that stressed
repayment  of foreign  debt  at all  costs.
The  Soviet  Union
It is estimated  that  Soviet  debt in convertible  currencies  amounted  in
1989 to  about  $56  billion,  roughly  124  percent  of exports  of goods  and
services.  The Soviet  Union  has large  international  reserves  (about  $15
billion),  and it is  a major  lender  with nominal  claims  estimated  at around
$132  billion.  However,  the  overall  quality  of those  claims  remains  unknown,  as
a large  share  of them  is  due  by countries  experiencing  debt repayment
difficulties.
Until 1988,  the  Soviet  Union  was  perceived  by external  creditors  as a
good  credit.  In the  early  years  of perestroika,  this -eputation  enabled  the  SU
to attract  massive  credits  from  major  Western  banks ($9  billion  in 1988,  and
$6.5  billion  in 1989).  But  by late  1989,  debt service  rose  to an estimated
$8.3  billion,  representing  about  21 percent  of exports  and  pessimism  has
replaced  the  earlier  euplboria.  The  perceived  risks  of lending  to the  Union
grew  considerably,  due to the  deterioration  of the trade  deficit  ($6.2  billion
in 1989  and growing  rapidly),  the  booming  state  deficit  (now  in excess  of 10
percent  of GDP),  and  to the  risks  of a major  split  in the  Union.
Payment  arrears  have recently  increased  to about  $3 billion  (by  August
1990),  but are  expected  to  be reduced  to $.5  billion  by year-end.  Short  term
debt  has increased,  and is  now estimated  at about  40 percent  of total  debt,-40-
with the  remainder  about  equally  split  between  commercial  and  official
sources.  President  Gorbachev  recently  hinted  that the  SU would  attempt  to
refinance  a large  share  of its  short  term  debt  with longer  terms  loans.
In spite  of those  difficulties,  the  issue  of debt  rescheduling  is  not
considered  seriously  at the  moment.  The  external  debt  situation  remains  far
from  critical,  and it is conceivable  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  be able to
attract  significant  inflows  in the  future.  But it is difficult  to predict  with
any  degree  of confidence  whether  and  when the  reform  program  will materialize
and take  hold,  and  when  will the  decline  in  economic  performance  will be
stopped  and  reversed.
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia's  external  debt is relatively  small [21  billion,  36 percent
of GNP, .9  times  exports),  and is  about  equally  divided  between  commercial  and
official  sources.  However,  its  economic  performance  has  been  weak,  partly
because  of heavy  debt  service  obligations  and it  has rescheduled  its  external
debt several  times  in the  eighties.  In addition  the  CA surplus  was achieved
through  a combination  of devaluations  and  compression  of imports,  leading  to
adverse  consequences  on investment  and  growth,  and  severe  imbalances  in  the
economy  that  ultimately  emerged  as hyperinflation  in the  late 1980s.
In 1988,  Yugoslavia  rescheduled  its  debt  with  both the  Paris (all
principal  payments  rescheduled  until  June 1990)  and  the  London  .'all  the  7
billion  outstanding,  no principal  payments  until  1994)  clubs.  As a result,  the
debt  burden  has  eased:  in 1989,  total  debts  service  amounted  to 25  percent  of
GNP  before  rescheduling.  And recently,  Yugoslavia  has  accumulated  large
reserves  and its  current  account  is in  surplus.  But  external  finance  is  not
likely  to flow  as long  as political  uncertainties  persist.  And the  lack  of
foreign  finance  represents  the  major  element  of risk in  the  reform  program:
without  inflows,  the  government  will  be unable  to finance  the  gap in  public
expenditures  without  posing  serious  threats  to  price  stability.-41-
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Table  1
Convertible  External  Debt in EE:  1989
(billion  of US dollars  and  percent)
--percent of total--
TED  TD/GNP  TD/X  Tot.  MLT  STD/1
Off.  Priv.
Bulgaria  16.2  148  430  18  37  45
Poland  43.3  80  500  75  18  2
Hungary  21.1  78  284  12  72  16
Yugoslavia  21.3  36  91  40  54  6
Czec.  8.0  16  97  14  50  36
Romania  0.5  0  3  0  0  100
Soviet  Union  44.5  n.a  132  30  29  41
1/ excluding  IMF  credit  which  is included  in official  credit.
Sources:  World  Debt  Tables,  1990-91  and  IIF  Reports.
Table  2
Net  Flows  of MLT  Debt in EE:  1980-1990
(billion  of US dollars)
1980  1982  1984  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
Bulgaria  n.a  n.a  1.3  0.8  0.4  2.4  1.5  0.4
Poland  3.0  1.3  0.2  0.7  -0.5  -0.3  -0.4
Hungary  0.7  0.2  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.2
Yugoslavia  2.2  0.1  -0.1  -0.9  -0.8  -0.8  -1.5
Czechoslovakia n.a  n.a  -1.0  -0.1  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.7
Romania  2.0  0.8  -1.1  -0.7  -1.5  -3.3  -1.6
Soviet  Union  n.a  n.a  2.6  -1.2  -1.3  6.8  6.5  4.2
Total  2.9  -0.4  -2.1  6.7  6.6
Sources:  World  Debt Tables,  1990-91  and  IIF  Reports.
Table  3
External  Debt  Rescheduling  in EE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paris  Club  London  Club  Present  Status
Bulgaria  Arrears  to com.  &
off.  creditors
Poland  81,  85,  86,  82, 83,  84,  86  Arrears  to com.
87,  90  87, 88  creditors
Hungary  none  none
Yugoslavia  84, 85,  86,  88  83, 84,  85,  88
Czechoslovakia  none  none
Romania  82, 83  82,  83,  86,  87
Sources:  World  Debt Tables,  1990-91.PBE Working  Eaper Series
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